Memory Processes · Degradation

Retrieval Interference

Example

You know one thing about a new colleague, and it comes to mind instantly. You know forty things about your closest friend, and recalling which restaurant she mentioned takes a beat longer, not because the memory is weaker but because there is more attached to her.

01

Retrieval Interference in Humans

Definition

The cost of retrieving a particular fact rises with the number of other facts stored about the same concept. In the study that established the effect, people learned sentences pairing a person with a location, and later took longer to verify any one sentence when the person or the location appeared in three of the learned sentences rather than one (⁠Anderson, 1974⁠). The human literature calls this the fan effect, where fan is the number of facts known about a concept (⁠Danker et al., 2011⁠). The cost attaches to the concept being probed rather than to the fact itself: because the same sentences were rotated through every condition across participants, a given fact became harder to reach purely as a function of how many neighbours its concepts had accumulated (⁠Anderson, 1974⁠).

Scope and contested mechanism: Anderson manipulated fan only between one and three facts per concept, so nothing here extends to unbounded accumulation. The mechanism producing the cost is not settled by the reaction-time data. Anderson's own model has a serial search through the facts attached to each concept, with searches from the different concepts in a probe running in parallel, but he notes that the data are equally compatible with a parallel search whose rate slows in proportion to the number of paths, and he leaves undecided whether a search stops on a match or exhausts the set (⁠Anderson, 1974⁠). ACT-R gives a different account, in which a fixed pool of spreading activation is divided among a cue's associates, so each additional association weakens the link between the cue and any one fact (⁠Danker et al., 2011⁠).

Neural Substrate

Human fMRI locates the resolution of retrieval competition in left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Badre et al. (2005) varied competition four ways during semantic decisions and found that a mid-VLPFC region responded to all four, and was the only region in which a behavioural factor common to three of the manipulations accounted for variance in the signal. Danker et al. (2011) carried this into the fan paradigm itself, with a qualification. In their predefined left VLPFC region the plain effects of person fan and location fan were not reliable on their own; fan effects emerged only in interaction with which cue participants had been trained to use during learning, and were larger for the fan of the attended cue than the unattended one. What the region tracks, on this reading, is competition among the associations a person is actually using to retrieve, not the raw number of associations stored.

Within VLPFC the control functions divide. An anterior region, roughly Brodmann area 47 on the pars orbitalis of the inferior frontal gyrus, responds when a cue is too weak to bring the target to mind unaided, and its activity co-varies with lateral temporal cortex, where semantic knowledge is stored. A mid region, roughly area 45 on the pars triangularis, responds instead to conflict among representations already retrieved, and does not co-vary with temporal cortex (⁠Badre et al., 2005⁠; ⁠Badre & Wagner, 2007⁠). The same split appears in lexical decision, under the labels anterior and posterior left inferior prefrontal cortex (⁠Gold et al., 2006⁠), and in episodic source recollection (⁠Dobbins & Wagner, 2005⁠). The regions these studies label are not identical. Danker et al. define theirs as a fixed box in Talairach space centred at −40, 21, 21 and described as parts of areas 45 and 46 around the inferior frontal sulcus, whereas the Badre and Wagner foci are reported in MNI space and lie ventral to that sulcus. All fall within left inferior frontal gyrus and its immediate surround, but the coordinates are not interchangeable.

02

AI at a Glance

In humans, the cost of retrieving a fact rises with the number of other facts attached to the concept used to reach it, and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex tracks the resulting competition (⁠Anderson, 1974⁠; ⁠Badre et al., 2005⁠; ⁠Danker et al., 2011⁠). AI systems show the same accumulation cost at all three levels where anyone has looked for it, in the weights, in the context window, and in an external retrieval index, but nothing in them corresponds to the prefrontal control that resolves the competition, and instructions to disregard superseded material largely fail (Roberts et al., 2024; Wang & Sun, 2025; Guo et al., 2026).

  • Weights: The numeric parameters fixed at the end of training, holding whatever the model absorbed from its training data (Roberts et al., 2024).
  • Context window: The span of text a model can take in at once on a given request, holding both the prompt and everything said so far in a conversation (⁠Wang & Sun, 2025⁠).
  • Retrieval index: An external store of documents searched at query time, whose results are handed to the model as text rather than held in its weights (⁠Guo et al., 2026⁠).
03

Retrieval Interference in AI

How Far It Has Been Measured

Measurement in AI: Directly Measured

AI Memory Performance: Comparable to Humans approximate provisional

Where It Lives in the System

What Has Been Measured

  • The fan paradigm has been given to AI by name in all three places AI holds information: in the context window (what a model can see in the current conversation) and in training data, where a 2024 preprint found fan effects in the confidence of only 2 of 6 language models (Mistral and SOLAR), and in saved memory, where a 2026 study tested retrieval systems against people (Roberts et al., 2024).
  • Deciding study: a 2026 paper (accepted at CogSci 2026 per its arXiv listing) gave three retrieval systems, the programs that look up stored text for an AI model, the same person-location sentences people studied: DPR (2020), ColBERTv2 (2022) and the hippocampus-inspired HippoRAG (2024), scored correct when the studied sentence came back first, at fans of 1, 2, 4 and 8 (only its fan and competitor results bear on this mechanism; its serial-position results bear on a different one) (⁠Guo et al., 2026⁠).
  • On a fitted interference slope (how fast discrimination falls as fan grows, on a log scale; lower is better), people scored 0.41 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.47), HippoRAG 0.44 (0.37 to 0.51), ColBERTv2 0.53 (0.45 to 0.61) and DPR 0.67 (0.58 to 0.76), so systems spanned 0.44 to 0.67 and only DPR differed reliably from people; in raw accuracy DPR fell from 94% to 58% by fan 4 while HippoRAG tracked the human curve (about 84% and 72% at fans 2 and 4) (⁠Guo et al., 2026⁠).
  • This comparison is approximate and favoured the AI: the systems held every sentence verbatim and were queried with no delay, while people had to remember after a distractor, and people judged old versus new while systems ranked stored sentences; HippoRAG matching people despite that advantage is a tie, not a win (⁠Guo et al., 2026⁠).
  • The Guo et al. numbers need independent checking: the reported slopes are about half what the paper's own human d' values (2.84, 2.21, 1.67) imply, and a query of a person's name alone, as described, could not yield the above-chance retrieval scores reported, so what the systems were asked is unclear; the study was not preregistered (⁠Guo et al., 2026⁠).
  • A second, weaker comparison in the context window: a 2025 preprint gave GPT-4 (a 2024 version) a 32-pair person-location recognition test with the study list in the same prompt, and d' fell from about 4.1 at fan 1 to 3.1 at fan 2; smaller open models (Mistral-7B, Llama-3-8B) showed the same trend at lower accuracy (⁠Cao et al., 2025⁠).
  • Cao et al.'s human values (about 3.7 and 2.5) are not stated in their cited source's text but match its plotted long-lag d' for Wickelgren and Corbett's six people studying word pairs and triples under response deadlines; with different materials, no reported spread and GPT-4 able to see the list, its similar cost (about 1.0 vs 1.2 to 1.3 d' units) is only a tie (⁠Schneider & Anderson, 2012⁠).
  • Proactive interference tests in AI have no human group: in a 2025 preprint (ICML workshop), dozens of language models tracking 46 repeatedly updated keys lost accuracy log-linearly toward zero as overwritten values piled up, even with the answer just before the question; the paper states that people do well on such tasks but tested none (⁠Wang & Sun, 2025⁠).
  • An A-B, A-C style study of 39 language models found proactive interference exceeded retroactive interference in every model (d = 1.73), which the authors call the reverse of the human pattern, but that contrast rests on past literature rather than people tested on the same items, so it cannot be scaled (⁠Chattaraj & Raj, 2026⁠).
  • Where people and models did share an updating task, a 2026 preprint testing 50 online adults and 9 language models on ten memory tasks, including tracking changing person-city pairs, found models near ceiling on every task with the material still in view, which does not count and measures updating capacity rather than an interference cost (Wang et al., 2026).

Purpose and Execution of Memory: Foundational Differences Between Human and AI Memory Architectures, and Implications

Elizabeth K. Bayardelle, PhD and Jennifer L. Thompson, PhD

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