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Ackerman (2026)

Evidence for Limited Metacognition in LLMs

arXiv

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Abstract

The possibility of LLM self-awareness and even sentience is gaining increasing public attention and has major safety and policy implications, but the science of measuring them is still in a nascent state. Here we introduce a novel methodology for quantitatively evaluating metacognitive abilities in LLMs. Taking inspiration from research on metacognition in nonhuman animals, our approach eschews model self-reports and instead tests to what degree models can strategically deploy knowledge of internal states. Using two experimental paradigms, we demonstrate that frontier LLMs introduced since early 2024 show increasingly strong evidence of certain metacognitive abilities, specifically the ability to assess and utilize their own confidence in their ability to answer factual and reasoning questions correctly and the ability to anticipate what answers they would give and utilize that information appropriately. We buttress these behavioral findings with an analysis of the token probabilities returned by the models, which suggests the presence of an upstream internal signal that could provide the basis for metacognition. We further find that these abilities 1) are limited in resolution, 2) emerge in context-dependent manners, and 3) seem to be qualitatively different from those of humans. We also report intriguing differences across models of similar capabilities, suggesting that LLM post-training may have a role in developing metacognitive abilities.

Reference

Ackerman, C. (2026). Evidence for Limited Metacognition in LLMs. arXiv preprint arXiv:2509.21545. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2509.21545

What Rests on This

1 mechanism cites this source. Each finding below is quoted as it appears on that mechanism's own page.

Metacognitive Control Metacognition

  • Measured in AI

    A peer-reviewed 2026 study tested this ability by name in 17 large language models (AI systems trained on vast amounts of text) using an answer-or-delegate game modelled on animal opt-out tasks, drawing on what the models learned in training; the link between being wrong and choosing to pass was weak (partial correlation 0.3 at best), and only one model, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, used passing to beat both its own and its teammate's accuracy (by 5.4 and 8.6 points)