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Balesni et al. (2024)

Lessons from Studying Two-Hop Latent Reasoning

arXiv

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Abstract

Large language models can use chain-of-thought (CoT) to externalize reasoning, potentially enabling oversight of capable LLM agents. Prior work has shown that models struggle at two-hop question-answering without CoT. This capability is so basic that if it was a fundamental limitation, it would imply that many complex agentic tasks would similarly require CoT. We investigate LLM latent reasoning capabilities using two-hop question answering as a case study. Previous work on the gap between latent and externalized two-hop reasoning produced mixed evidence with inconclusive results. In this paper, we introduce a controlled setting for investigating two-hop reasoning in LLMs, where a positive result provides definitive evidence for latent reasoning. We fine-tune LLMs (including Llama 3 8B and GPT-4o) on synthetic facts and test two-hop reasoning over these facts. By using synthetic facts, we rule out memorization and reasoning shortcuts as explanations for two-hop performance. We observe a nuanced picture: Models fail to compose two synthetic facts, but can succeed when one fact is synthetic and the other is natural. These results demonstrate that LLMs are undeniably capable of latent two-hop reasoning, although it remains unclear how this ability scales with model size. Finally, we highlight a lesson for researchers studying LLM reasoning: when drawing conclusions about LLM latent reasoning, one must be careful to avoid both spurious successes (that stem from memorization and reasoning shortcuts) and spurious failures (that may stem from artificial experimental setups, divorced from training setups of frontier LLMs).

Reference

Balesni, M., Korbak, T., & Evans, O. (2024). Lessons from Studying Two-Hop Latent Reasoning. arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.16353. https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2411.16353

What Rests on This

1 mechanism cites this source. Each finding below is quoted as it appears on that mechanism's own page.

Integrative Inference Memory Processes

  • Measured in AI

    For facts learned in training, a preprint fine-tuned Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B, GPT-4o-mini and GPT-4o on invented facts placed in separate documents: all models answered single facts accurately but were at chance on questions linking two facts unless allowed to reason step by step in writing, when accuracy became high; in Llama 3 8B, seeing both facts together in one document or in the conversation gave non-zero accuracy

  • Measured in AI

    Not yet compared: no study gives people and AI the same integrative inference test, though one could; the only human score beside AI ([Maharana et al., 2024](cite:maharana-2024c)) lacks sample and procedure; in-context tests let AI see the premises while people must remember them, so strong AI results there cannot count; and training-based failures come from a no-written-reasoning condition people are not held to, with no human data on a shared scale