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Ranjan & Odegaard (2024)

Reality monitoring and metacognitive judgments in a false-memory paradigm

Neuroscience Research, 201, 3-17

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Abstract

How well do we distinguish between different memory sources when the information from imagination and perception is similar? And how do metacognitive (confidence) judgments differ across different sources of experiences? To study these questions, we developed a reality monitoring task using semantically related words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm of false memories. In an orientation phase, participants either perceived word pairs or had to voluntarily imagine the second word of a word pair. In a test phase, participants viewed words and had to judge whether the paired word was previously perceived, imagined, or new. Results revealed an interaction between memory source and judgment type on both response rates and confidence judgments: reality monitoring was better for new and perceived (compared to imagined) sources, and participants often incorrectly reported imagined experiences to be perceived. Individuals exhibited similar confidence between correct imagined source judgments and incorrect imagined sources reported to be perceived. Modeling results indicated that the observed judgments were likely due to an externalizing bias (i.e., a bias to judge the memory source as perceived). Additionally, we found that overall metacognitive ability was best in the perceived source. Together, these results reveal a source-dependent effect on response rates and confidence ratings, and provide evidence that observers are surprisingly prone to externalizing biases when monitoring their own memories.

Reference

Ranjan, S., & Odegaard, B. (2024). Reality monitoring and metacognitive judgments in a false-memory paradigm. Neuroscience Research, 201, 3-17.

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Reality Monitoring Metacognition

  • Measured in humans

    When the imagined and perceived words come from the same false-memory (DRM) word lists, performance collapses: 34 adults judging 72 perceived, 72 imagined and 72 new items identified imagined sources correctly only 29% of the time (SD 26%, chance 33%), calling most of them perceived

  • Measured in AI

    People on the same word lists did far worse than that best model: in the human study (N = 34, incidental encoding, one session) accuracy was 63% (SD 18%) for perceived, 29% (SD 26%) for imagined and 66% (SD 21%) for new items, and a model of their responses put source discrimination at only 0.11 on a 0–1 scale. These figures come from the authors' 2023 PsyArXiv revision preprint; the journal full text could not be retrieved